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COMPETITIVE ACTION REPERTOIRE 
IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Our paper describes how competitive action repertoire concept and 
the external regulatory environment inß uence the performance of a Þ rm in 
the regulated telecommunications sector. Based on panel data of 103 Þ rms 
across Europe that provide Þ xed broadband Internet to end customers dur-
ing the time period of 3 years, results indicate that aggressiveness and the 
complexity of an offer have a positive relationship with market share growth. 
Contrary to widespread views, we Þ nd that the most aggressive Þ rms in the 
market in fact lose market share on a year-on-year basis. Our results sug-
gest that complexity and aggressiveness have a positive relationship with 
changes in market share gains and that the effects hold for non-regulated 
Þ rms, but not for regulated ones.
Keywords: competitive dynamics, competitive repertoire, regulation, 
telecommunications industry, Þ xed broadband
1. Introduction
Today’s hypercompetitive environment is constantly modiÞ ed and challenged 
by current strategies. Competitive dynamics research studies competitive moves 
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and countermoves among rivals on the market, their strategic orientation and orga-
nizational context (Baum & Korn, 1996). It helps us explain the success and failure 
of a Þ rm and offers a useful integrative framework within the modern strategic 
management theory that connects the micro and the macro level of strategic think-
ing, strategic formation and implementation (Miler & Chen, 2012).
Until some 30 years ago, network utilities were state monopolies. Due to poor 
performance and innovation lagging behind, countries began with a liberaliza-
tion process which involved privatization, competitive restructuring and set up of 
new regulatory mechanisms (Armstrong et al., 1994). Competition is now strongly 
inß uenced by the regulatory regime that is based on open access to incumbent 
networks, where wholesale access to Þ xed networks and regulatory obligations at 
retail level have a positive inß uence on the shape of industry dynamics. Regulatory 
obligations have been imposed on the incumbents’ intensiÞ ed competitive dynam-
ics among players on the market. Challengers buy the incumbents’ wholesale ser-
vices and compete with them in the same market. Being more ß exible than their 
main opponent, they are able to offer services on the incumbent’s network at the 
same quality level but at lower prices.
This study challenges the beneÞ ts of aggressive and complex strategy of com-
petitive repertoire on market share growth in the telecommunications industry. 
The question is why are big telecommunications Þ rms experiencing market share 
downturns? Is such result a consequence of their competitive intensity? Or is it a 
consequence of the complexity of their competitive repertoire? How does govern-
ment intervention, through regulation, affect changes in market share gains?
In competitive dynamics studies, research used to include internal and exter-
nal factors which helped to explain competitive intensity and the impact of com-
petitive behavior on the performance of a Þ rm. The intention of this empirical 
study is to analyze competitive intensity under the burden of regulation and to 
Þ nd effects of competitive aggressiveness on market share growth in the regulated 
telecommunications industry.
This study contributes to competitive dynamics research in two ways. First, 
we contribute to the analysis of the competitive action repertoire and its impact 
on the change in market share gains in a regulated telecommunications sector. 
Second, we study the effect of regulatory obligations on strategic directions of 
regulated and non-regulated Þ rms by analyzing the relationship between the com-
petitive action repertoire and the year-on-year market share gains they achieve. 
Competitive repertoire study in the telecommunications sector is Lee’s (2017) in-
centive to conduct a more detailed study of competitive behavior in the global 
industry settings, where moves and countermoves of competing Þ rms should be 
more carefully analyzed due to the inß uence of speciÞ c external factors, such as 
changes in the government regulatory policy. This empirical investigation is an 
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extension of the current competitive dynamics research that connects macro-com-
petitive (regulation) and micro-actor viewpoints (competitive intensity and com-
petitive complexity).
The following sections contain a presentation of the theoretical bases: com-
petitive repertoire and regulatory inß uence on competitive behavior. They are fol-
lowed by a developed hypothesis that builds on the current research in competitive 
dynamics research by applying external regulatory factors that determine competi-
tive behavior and trigger changes in market share gains. The methodology section 
provides details of the data collection process, statistical methods and the results 
of the empirical study. The discussion section compares empirical results with 
other theoretical and empirical Þ ndings, as well as implications for managerial 
practices. The paper ends with a conclusion and limitations and directions for fu-
ture research in the competitive dynamics theory.
2. Theorethical background and hypothesis
The central part of the competitive dynamics research is an action. It is 
deÞ ned as internally and externally newly detected market-based competitive 
move used by an organization during a given time period in order to defend your 
competitive position (Jacobson, 1992; Grimm & Smith, 1997; Smith, Grimm & 
Gannon, 1992, Chen & Hambrick 1995; Ferrier, Smith & Grimm, 1999, Miller & 
Chen, 1996). The term ‘an action’ comes from the Austrian school and it repre-
sents Schumpeter’s (1950) effort to explain the way Þ rms affect each other while 
aiming to achieve competitive advantage. The Austrian school sees competition 
as a dynamic process by which Þ rms are destroying market equilibrium and es-
tablishing it again. The main focus is change - competitive move by one Þ rm may 
cause a series of moves and countermoves by competitors in the market (D’Aveni, 
1994; Lee, 2017).
Competitive action repertoire is deÞ ned as a set of actions that Þ rms un-
dertake in a speciÞ c time period (usually one year) (Miller & Chen, 1994, 1996, 
Ferrier & Smith, 1999). Extensively studied parts of the competitive repertoire are 
Þ rms’ aggressiveness and competitive complexity (Ferrier, 2001; Connelly et al., 
2016, Andrevski & Ferrier, 2016). Competitive aggressiveness stands for Þ rms’ 
intensity on the market and represents multiple initiated moves and responses car-
ried out over time (Ferrier, 2001), while competitive complexity captures set of 
different types of actions Þ rms undertake (Ferrier, 2001; Miller and Chen, 1996).
Competitive aggressiveness is the main construct in the competitive dy-
namics research and it is the answer to differences in Þ rm performance (Chen 
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et al., 2010; Young et al., 1996). It shows in what way are certain Þ rms doing 
better than their competitors. Empirical research of competitive dynamics Þ nds 
that aggressiveness has a positive impact on changes in Þ rm performance (Ferrier, 
2001; Katila et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2010; Derfus et al., 2008; Young et al., 1996; 
Andrevski et al., 2014). Nadkarni et al. (2015) presented three main beneÞ ts of 
being aggressive: a) it brings value added to customers by offering better products 
or services at lower prices, b) it positively impacts performance measures because 
other Þ rms on the market cannot easily follow aggressive Þ rms, and c) being ag-
gressive over time enables Þ rms to jump into the constant process of learning by 
doing (by real-time information from the market).
Beside the general conclusion that competitive aggressiveness positively 
impacts performance, there are empirical studies that show different effects of 
competitive aggressiveness on Þ rm performance. Positive impact is especially 
evident in a hypercompetitive environment where competitive advantage is tem-
porarily achieved (D’Aveni, 1994), like in the fast growing industries (Nadkarni 
et al., 2015), in the growing markets (Andrevski & Ferrier, 2016), or in newly de-
veloped markets (Chen & Miller, 2012). In those markets, Þ rms with continuous 
and aggressive competitive strategy are more successful (Katila & Chen, 2008). 
On the other hand, we can Þ nd empirical studies that failed to Þ nd a statistically 
signiÞ cant relationship (Chen et al, 1995; Hambrick et al, 1996) or that proved op-
posed results. For example, Chen et al. (2010) have found a negative relationship by 
analyzing competitive behavior in established and newly developed markets. They 
showed that Þ rms with high performance are not motivated to use aggressive strat-
egy. Their objective is to maintain the status quo and to be adequately prepared 
to respond to competitor attack.  But smaller Þ rms are using the strategy of being 
aggressive in order to take over a part of the market (Chen et al., 2010). Katila et 
al. (2012) found that all Þ rms (despite their resource background) can beneÞ t from 
competitive aggressiveness. It depends on the market on which they compete – new 
or already established. In newly developed markets Þ rm aggressiveness positively 
impacts performance. Andrevski & Ferrier (2016) have conducted an empirical 
study of Þ rms in three different industry sectors characterized by hypercompeti-
tive environment and concluded that aggressive competitive strategy impacts per-
formance in a ‘U’ curve shape. Very aggressive strategy is accompanied by higher 
costs that negatively impact Þ rm performance. Firms differ in the resources and 
capabilities they possess, causing them to develop different actions. However, hav-
ing more resources is not always a guarantee to compete more aggressively on the 
market and to be more successful. Ndofor et al. (2011), Miller & Shamsie (1996) 
and Derfus et al. (2008) have shown that resources are important for competitive 
aggressiveness and Þ rm performance. On the other hand, Andrevski & Ferrier 
(2016) found that even Þ rms with specialized technological resources and dense 
alliance networks can beneÞ t from competitive aggressiveness.
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According to the above mentioned results of empirical studies, we can conclude 
that aggressive competitive strategy is not suitable for all and Þ rms should be more 
concentrated on effective and balanced actions in order to outperform rivals and 
achieve performance goals (Liberman & Montgomery, 1998). In the regulated tele-
communications sector incumbents possess rich resource portfolios, knowledge and 
experience on the market. They are the most aggressive on the market and in many 
analyzed countries have the highest market share. On the other hand, challengers 
have the opportunity to use the incumbent’s resources at wholesale level and by ap-
plying the strategy of being more aggressive they can positively impact performance. 
The Þ rst hypothesis intends to empirically test the relationship between competitive 
intensity and Þ rm performance in one regulated telecommunications industry:
H1 There is a positive relationship between competitive aggressiveness and 
market share gains.
Competitive complexity is a representation of a Þ rm’s intensity on the mar-
ket and a mixture of multiple initiated moves and countermoves over time (Ferrier, 
2001). Competitive complexity is a function of a Þ rm’s internal factors. Internal 
factors are embodied in a Þ rm’s resources and capabilities. They can produce posi-
tive changes in the market share by price changes (short-term effects), or by en-
hancing the perceived value of their services. Whereas, external factors can drive 
market share changes via a competitor’s entrance or exit, customers’ willingness 
to buy more, market characteristics, regulatory environment, etc. An action can 
be the introduction of new products and services, service improvements, setting 
lower prices (for example due to economies of scale) or upper prices (due to qual-
ity improvements), actions of extensive advertising, etc. Firms are usually using a 
mix of the above-mentioned types of actions. What kind of competitive repertoire 
to use, depends on the environment in which Þ rms do their business. In a stable 
environment Þ rms are using repetitive simplicity, while in unstable environments 
they tend to use a more complex set of actions (Miller & Chen, 1996).
The strategy of competitive complexity repertoire seems challenging, how-
ever, Þ rms beneÞ t from it. Empirical investigations contribute to valuable insights 
about outcomes and antecedents of the competitive complexity concept. Studies 
have found their positive relationship with Þ rm performance (Ferrier & Lee, 2002, 
Miller & Chen 1996). Competitive complexity is also a function of prior perfor-
mance of a Þ rm (Miller & Chen, 1996), multimarket contacts (Yu et al., 2009) 
and top management team heterogeneity (Miller & Chen, 1996). Complexity rep-
resents the Þ rm’s ability to launch different sets of actions. Yet, is the competi-
tive complexity concept a necessity to achieve required performance? Complex 
competitive repertoire is a signal of a Þ rm’s quality and efÞ ciency in adequately 
pursuing resources and Þ rm capabilities, it ensures positive signals from stake-
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holders (Miller & Chen, 1996) and results in improved Þ rm performance (Ndofor 
et al, 2011; Carnes et al., 2019). Connelly et al. (2016) Þ nd that complexity harms 
performance at the early stage, but that later it has positive effects.
Our second hypothesis aims to empirically test the relationship between a 
Þ rm’s complexity and market share gains in the telecommunications sector. It is 
known that incumbents are capable of generating different types of competitive 
moves because of their resources, knowledge and experience. Challengers used 
to use a lower number of resources (the Þ rst challenger can be an exception) and 
concentrate on a certain type of competitive moves.
The hypothesis is as follows:
H2 There is a positive relationship between offer complexity and market share 
gains.
Regulation has an inß uence on the relationship between the competitive 
action repertoire and Þ rm performance.
Sources of competitive repertoire can be found inside, as well as outside the 
organization. Applying different antecedents can be beneÞ cial for an improved 
contextualization of competitive moves and their consequences on Þ rm perfor-
mance. Big and small Þ rms use different competitive strategies, and they behave 
differently in already established and new markets. Characteristics used outside 
the organization are environmental change (Nadkarni et al., 2015), institutional 
investors (Connelly et al., 2016; Morgan & Ferrier, 2014; Morgan et al., 2018), new 
or established markets (Chen et al., 2012), market growth (Miller & Chen, 1996) 
and industry concentration (Ferrier, 2001).
In this empirical study there is an intention to use a new antecedent that 
shapes competitive behavior and Þ rm performance - regulation. Regulation is an 
external factor that impacts competitive strategy and performance in the telecom-
munications industry. The telecommunications sector is highly regulated, where 
regulatory agencies regulate mainly those Þ rms with a signiÞ cant market share, 
rich technological resources, knowledge and capability to exploit it. Accordingly, 
regulated Þ rms are relatively more aggressive in the actions they launch on the 
market. However, since they are regulated, they are limited in exploitation of their 
resources and capabilities. This is especially evident in the prices of offers they 
deliver, compared to those of competitors. As a consequence, many incumbents 
are faced with a downturn in market share gains on a yearly basis. The regulation 
process opened up the market and attracted new investors and concentration in-
dexes started to decrease (Peji  Bach et al., 2013). 
In competitive dynamics research there are differences in performance be-
tween small Þ rms with limited access to resources and those with a rich resource 
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base (Katila, et al., 2012). Firms with rich internal and external resources compete 
more aggressively on the market (Ndofor et al., 2011), and deliver superior proÞ ts. 
Andrevski & Ferrier (2016) pointed out that the strategy of being more aggressive 
on the market is not the key to deliver superior performance for a longer period 
and Þ rms with specialized technological resources can also be a source of superior 
performance. But we still lack knowledge of why some of the more aggressive 
Þ rms with a rich resource portfolio still incur losses in market shares gains, while 
others do not. The third hypothesis aims to empirically test the relationship be-
tween the competitive action repertoire and market share gains, for regulated and 
non-regulated Þ rms.
H4 Regulated and non-regulated Þ rms differ in the relationship between the 
competitive action repertoire and market share gains.
3. Measures
Dependent variable
Firm performance represents the long-term tendency and strength of a Þ rm. 
In strategic management studies, it can be measured via Þ nancial and non-Þ nan-
cial indicators. Firms include market share as a non-Þ nancial indicator that stands 
for the key indicators of the growth (Makador, 1999; O’Regan, 2002; Ferrier et al., 
1999; Rindova et al., 2010, Andrevski et al, 2014). Higher market share enhances 
higher Þ nancial performance and greater customer retention (O’Regan, 2002). 
Empirical research on competitive dynamics shows different and opposing results 
in the market share-proÞ tability relationship. Gale & Buzzell (1993) and Porter 
(1979) contend that market share has a positive impact on Þ rm proÞ tability. On 
the other hand, researchers (Armstrong & Green, 2007; Mische, 2001; Kay, 1993; 
Woo & Cooper, 1983) suggest that market share is not the main indicator of Þ rm 
performance, and a small market share can also be the source of Þ rm proÞ tability. 
Despite the above-mentioned opposing results, we can be sure that market share 
is relevant and that a declining market share alerts Þ rms to quickly react in order 
for the Þ rm to regain its position or develop it in new markets (Yang & Meyer, 
2015). It describes the position of a Þ rm within an industry and can be explained 
as a function of the Þ rm’s internal and external factors. In the telecommunications 
sector, market share is usually one of the Þ rm’s primary objectives. It is commonly 
used in the Þ xed part of the network, where incumbents hold a signiÞ cant part of 
the market and other operators are Þ ghting for each of the incumbent’s customers. 
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Market share can also be seen as an indicator of regulatory agencies’ effectiveness, 
in the sense that it can explain the success/failure of their regulatory strategies.
Empirical research relies on previously validated measurement items (Ferrier 
et al., 1999; Andrevski & Ferrieri, 2016) in order to capture performance and ac-
tion-based variables. It applies year-on-year change in the customer’s market share.
Firms’ market share is calculated as:
Where i represents the Þ rm, t represents time and L represents subscriptions 
on the country level.
Change in the market share is calculated as follows:
Positive values indicate a positive change in year-on-year market change, 
while negative values indicate a negative change in market share gains.
Independent variables
Action aggressiveness is measured by the number of competitive moves 
initiated by Þ rms, relative to the sum of all competitive moves on the market. 
According to the previous research (Andrevski & Ferrier, 2016), we focused on 
externally detected product-market actions.
Actions
i,t
 represents the number of competitive moves initiated by a Þ rm and 
Actions
kL,t
  represents the number of actions initiated by all Þ rms in the country k 
and during a certain time period.
Offer complexity represents the within-Þ rm action type diversity (Ferrier et 
al.,1999).
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Where  represents the proportion of ith Þ rm’s actions in total ac-
tions initiated by a Þ rm in a certain period of time. A high value of offer complexi-
ty indicates a broad set of action types that a Þ rm undertakes.
Moderating and Control variables
All models include a set of dummy variables on a yearly basis in order to 
control time-speciÞ c factors. We used control variables technological solutions 
and Year effect. Technological capabilities enable Þ rms to create a more complex 
set of action types that differentiate them from rivals (Ndofor et al., 2011). By us-
ing different technological capabilities, Þ rms cover different geographical areas in 
the country. This enables them to create speedy actions that have positive inß uence 
on product/market Þ rm activity (Yang & Meyer, 2015). We counted a number of 
technological solutions Þ rms applied in a certain time period.
Telecommunications is one of the sectors where regulatory reform has had 
successful results, especially in the retail segment (Winston, 1993). Hence, we 
applied the control/moderating variable as a dummy variable for regulation (1 is 
when the Þ rm is regulated, and 0 is otherwise).
4. Method
The telecommunications sector provides an interesting empirical Þ eld to 
study competitive dynamics because of its historical background, where priva-
tization and deregulation processes paved the way of a Þ rm’s aggressiveness 
among rivals. We studied companies that provide Þ xed broadband Internet ac-
cess to end customers in European countries. The telecommunications sector is 
characterized by high capital intensity, with relatively high market concentration 
indices that show decline tendency (Peji  Bach et al., 2013). Investigated Þ rms 
are mainly listed on the stock markets and usually provide detailed informa-
tion about their market shares, competitive moves and regulatory obligations. 
Hence, empirical research is based on desk research methods from secondary 
data sources.
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4.1. Research instrument
Followed by previous researches, the focus is on externally detected product-
market actions (Ferrier et al, 1999; Andrevksi & Ferrier, 2016). Opposed to the 
usual structural content data collection research instrument, this empirical study 
is based on the secondary data published on the websites of analyzed Þ rms. In this 
way we avoided the commonly stated critique of the structural content data analy-
sis (Smith, Ferrier & Ndofor, 2001). Structural data content analysis has undoubt-
edly contributed to the competitive dynamics research in explaining the relation-
ship between the competitive repertoire and Þ rm performance. But it is criticized 
in the part of reasonable doubt in collection of all competitive moves. For example, 
less interesting competitive moves are not reported by media. Additionally, com-
petitive moves by small Þ rms on the market are often not covered. This research 
includes a higher number of Þ rms, even those with a small market share. Moreover, 
the empirical study includes more than two Þ rms on the market (opposed to the 
commonly used dyad level Þ rm competitive analysis) and analyzes in more depth 
the competitive intensity among competing Þ rms.
4.2. Data
The empirical study covers European countries because of their histori-
cal similarity and regulatory background. The dataset comes mainly from the 
data published by the European Commission, Telecommunication Regulatory 
Agencies, and companies included into our sample. On an annual basis, the 
European Commission publishes pricing benchmarks for Fixed Broadband offers. 
The scope of that benchmark is to collect, analyze, and compare offers in order 
to consider what end consumers are paying for in EU28 as well as in other coun-
tries (e.g. Japan, Switzerland, USA, etc.)1. That includes retail offers launched by 
operators that all together hold at least 90% of market share in each country at 
the European level. For example, the 2013 benchmark covers more than 160 Þ rms 
that operate in European countries. For some of them we did not get the data for 
each year we had studied, therefore, the Þ rms with missing data for one or more 
years are excluded from the study in order to reach a balanced panel data set. The 
offers are collected during a certain time of the year (over our sampled period: 
1 The Broadband Internet Acces Cost (BIAC) reporting tool presents data from the annual 
BIAC study, which is performed by Van Dijk Management Consultants for DG Information Society 
and Media of the European Commision.
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every February). Moreover, we consulted experts responsible for pricing strate-
gies from some European Þ rms in order to verify the reliability of collected data. 
We found that our data represents very well the relative aggressiveness of a Þ rm. 
Relative aggressiveness on the market can be compared with the customer base 
at the end of the previous year (as many collected offers are valid from the previ-
ous year). For each of the above-mentioned countries, data concerning customer 
base growth are collected on a yearly basis. The European Commission annually 
publishes Þ gures for incumbents and all other operators. As data for challeng-
ers was unavailable from this source, it is collected directly from the relevant 
companies’ websites, as well as other sources that provide searched data (e.g. 
National Regulatory Agencies, Business Monitor Reports, etc.). The empirical 
study begins with year 2010 as the base year that is not included in the statistical 
model. Following Ferrier et al. (1999), the collected actions are grouped into the 
following sections: new product, service quality upgrades (advertised download 
speed), change in prices and contract duration actions. Each competitive offer is 
analyzed and classiÞ ed into above mentioned action types. The same methodol-
ogy is applied for all years.
4.3. Statistical method
In total, there are collected data for 103 Þ rms operating in 28 European 
countries over the period 2010-2013. Hence, the sample provides a panel of busi-
ness in the telecommunications sector, with a good representation of regulated 
and non-regulated Þ rms operating on the market. A panel data analysis with 
Þ xed and random effects is applied. The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is used 
for testing the type of panel data model (Þ xed or random) and VIF test for ana-
lyzing multicollinearity effects. We used the established stepwise moderation 
approach (Aiken & West, 1991) to test for the interaction effects of imposed 
regulation on competitive aggressiveness and competitive complexity, as well 
as the Wald test in order to jointly test the signiÞ cance for the total effects of 
independent variables on market share change. Hausman test suggest using the 
random effects model. CoefÞ cients show that multicollinearity is not an issue as 
the VIF does not exceed the commonly used cutoff value of 5 (VIF=4,04 in case 
of interaction effect – Model 5).
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5. Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of variables 
examined in this study.
Table 1. 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE MODEL
Table 2 shows the results of the panel data regression analysis for all hypoth-
eses.
Source: by authors 
N Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Log Change in Market 
Share
308 .02359 .1788
2 Log Relative 
Agressiveness
307 -1.883 .64882 .013
3 Regulated x Log 
Relative 
Aggressiveness
307 -.70066 1.392.6 .016** .018
4 Offer Complexity 307 .38017 .2025 .136** -.184 .090
5 Regulated x Offer 
Complexity
307 .15709 .31280 -.034 .339** -336*** .160***
6 Log Number of 
Technological 
Solutions
307 .50647 .42332 -.021 .382*** -.007 .055** .102**
7 Regulated 412 .4344 .73367 -.031** .210*** -1.73*** -.012 .359*** .063*
where *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001
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Table 2. 
RESULTS OF THE PANEL DATA REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Model 1 in Table 2 takes into account only the control variables while all the 
unobserved heterogeneity is packed in the random effect component. The results 
suggest that regulation has a negative effect to year-on-year change in market share 
for regulated Þ rms, while the number of technological solutions pushed by Þ rms 
positively impacts change in market share gains, but the results are not statistically 
signiÞ cant.
The Þ rst hypothesis studies the relationship between competitive aggressive-
ness and changes in market share on a year-on-year basis. Model 2 in Table 2 shows 
the results for the Þ rst hypothesis. The coefÞ cient for the linear term of relative 
competitive aggressiveness is positive and statistically signiÞ cant (B=0,03, p<0,1). 
The more aggressive you are relative to your opponents, the better results in the 
market share you achieve. The given results of the empirical study are consistent 
Source: by authors 


















Log Relative Agressiveness 0.036** 0.033* 0.056***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.021]
Offer Complexity 0.147*** 0.141*** 0.186***
[0.051] [0.051] [0.060]
Regulated x Log Relative Agressiveness -0.059*
[0.034]
Regulated x Offer Complexity -0.163
[0.110]
Control variables
Log Number of Technological Solutions 0.008 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 -0.010
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Regulated -0.063*** -0.074*** -0.078*** -0.057** -0.113
[0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.072]
Intercept
Constant 0.065*** 0.089** 0.134*** 0.018 0.115**
[0.021] [0.043] [0.041] [0.027] [0.054]
Observations 307 307 307 307 307
Number of Firms 103 103 103 103 103
Company RE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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with theoretical and other empirical Þ ndings in competitive dynamics research. 
Ferrier et al. (1999) revealed a positive relationship between competitive intensity 
and market share gains. Ndofor et al. (2011) also showed the same positive trend 
in analyzing competitive behavior Þ rms in the in-vitro diagnostic substance manu-
facturing industry.
The second hypothesis tests the relationship between Þ rms’ complexity and 
change in market share gains. Results in Table 2 and in Model 3 show that if 
Þ rms undertake more complex sets of different action types, they are supposed to 
achieve positive change in market share gains (B=0,141, p<0,01). Firms in the tele-
communications sector use different technological capabilities in order to acquire 
and achieve wider geographical coverage and satisfy different customers’ prefer-
ences in the area of service quality and new products. Bundling Þ xed broadband 
Internet with other telecom services gives them the freedom to launch different 
products, set different service prices and bind customers with different contract 
durations. The results presented above are consistent with other empirical and 
theoretical achievements (Ndofor et al., 2015; Carnes et al., 2019).
Model 5 in table 2 incorporates the interaction effects between the competi-
tive repertoire and information about regulation status and suggests that a Þ rm’s 
aggressiveness and offer complexity positively and statistically signiÞ cantly affect 
change in market share gains for non-regulated Þ rms. On the other hand, regu-
lated Þ rms, even more relatively aggressive on the market, are faced with negative 
trends in market share changes.
We applied the Wald test in order to jointly test the signiÞ cance for the to-
tal effects of independent variables on market share change. Results show that 
regulated and non-regulated Þ rms differ in offer complexity and aggressiveness. 
Aggressiveness and offer complexity positively affect market share change for 
non-regulated Þ rms, while the total effect is not statistically signiÞ cant for regu-
lated Þ rms.
6. Discussion
Empirical research shows that competitive aggressiveness and competitive 
complexity positively impact market share growth in general. This conclusion is 
in accordance with other empirical and theoretical studies, such as papers from 
Andrevski & Ferrier (2016), Ferrier et al. (1999), Ndofor et al. (2015) and Carnes 
et al. (2019). Entering into a deeper analysis of competitive behavior of telecom-
munications Þ rms, we Þ nd very speciÞ c and interesting results.
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This paper suggests that competitive repertoire has different implications on 
market share gains for regulated and non-regulated Þ rms. In fact, this conclusion 
brings the value added in competitive dynamics research and gives an effort to 
integrate other antecedents that deÞ ne competitor behavior on the market. The 
results show that competitive intensity on the regulated Þ xed broadband market in 
28 European countries positively inß uences market share gains for non-regulated 
Þ rms, while this relationship is not positive for the regulated ones. Regulated Þ rms 
are those with higher market shares. They use a rich resource portfolio, economy 
of scale, beneÞ ts of brand awareness and rich working experience (Woo & Cooper, 
1981). Chen et al. (2010) Þ nd that very successful Þ rms are not motivated to ag-
gressively perform on established market, until they are attacked. Our results con-
sider that Þ rms with high market share act very aggressively on the market. One 
of the reasons can be their rich resource portfolio they activate in order to retain 
market position. Opposed to the larger ones, smaller Þ rms are more ß exible, have 
a ß atter organizational structure, easily indulge into risk, they are proactive and 
very aggressive. Connelly et al. (2016) Þ nd that small Þ rms constantly improve 
their performance measures. The obtained results can be compared with those 
from Andrevski & Ferrier (2016) who included internal Þ rm factors and found that 
competitive aggressiveness is not the main key success. It is useful until additional 
competitive aggressiveness induces additional costs that diminish performance. 
Chen et al. (2012) split Þ rms into large and small, based on the resources they use. 
They Þ nd that both can succeed by engaging in competitive activity, depending 
on the market on which they compete – new or already established. Smaller Þ rms 
should focus on strategic moves that are not easily viewed by larger Þ rms, trying 
to Þ nd a market niche and put the focus on activities that reduce costs of current 
products in the case of established markets. In the new markets they should avoid 
investments in R&D of new products because of negative implications on perfor-
mance (Chen et al., 2012).
Regulation process opened up a market for new entrants and introduced a 
new competitive dynamics on the market. Regulation limits former monopolies in 
their capabilities on the market. Consequently, many regulated Þ rms in European 
countries are losing market share, mainly in the wealthier areas of large cities 
where they meet more competitive pressure from challengers.
The liberalization process induced technology diffusion, where companies 
are setting up their competitive strategies based on an inter-platform and intra-
platform basis. Intra-platform competition is based on incumbents’ networks, al-
lowing challengers to lease infrastructure from incumbents and to differentiate 
from them based on service prices, while inter-platform competition is based on 
many other platforms which operators are using in order to gain competitive ad-
vantage and differentiate themselves from incumbents (frequently used technolo-
gies are based on coax cable and Þ ber optics). For example, in Croatia, the com-
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pany A1 (former Vipnet) invests into its own infrastructure (cable network and 
Satellite) and buys wholesale services from the incumbent (Bitstream and ULL). 
The investment strategy gives them more freedom to reconÞ gure their technologi-
cal solutions and concentrate more attention on targeted customers in certain parts 
of the country that seem more proÞ table (larger cities), while services based on 
incumbent’s network enable them to acquire a larger customer base by offering 
services at lower prices that are supposed to migrate into their privately owned 
technological solution. A1 recorded positive changes in market share gains on a 
year-on-year basis (2010-2013). On the other hand, the incumbent T-HT possesses 
a rich resource portfolio, the capability to exploit it and knowledge and experience 
on the market. The regulation process limits them in the pricing strategy, allowing 
other operators to enter the market. As a consequence, they are losing market share 
on a year-on-year basis, despite the competitive intensity.
This empirical research analyzes a quite speciÞ c market segment in the tele-
communications industry – Þ xed broadband. SpeciÞ city is in quite strong rules 
imposed mainly on former incumbents by independent regulatory agencies and 
the fact that Þ rms compete in the same market under different rules. Additionally, 
empirical research is based on the analysis of competitive moves and their impact 
on performance indices based on more than two Þ rms on each analyzed market, 
which put additional value to the competitive dynamics research. 
Managerial implications 
The consulting company EY used to conduct interviews with senior indus-
try executives in the telecommunications sector at the global level. Results for 
2012 show that the key issues the operators face in the telecommunications sector 
are as follows: Capex demand due to data growth, the need to improve margins, 
regulation, spectrum availability and increased competition (EY, 2012). Only three 
years later, the most signiÞ cant challenges that the industry is facing are (EY, 
2015): disruptive competition, uncertain regulatory environment, ect. The key is-
sues for the above mentioned analysis are investments, regulation and competition. 
In European countries, new entrants are continuously gaining positive effects on 
market share gains, but the incumbent operators still control more than 40% of 
customer subscriptions (EC, 2014). Empirical studies across 28 European coun-
tries take into consideration a positive relationship between competitive aggres-
siveness and complexity with market share growth for non-regulated Þ rms. This 
signals that challengers should focus on competitive intensity strategy and direct 
more attention to different types of competitive moves. They have the opportunity 
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on the market and, by efÞ ciently managing their costs, they can achieve a higher 
market share and improve proÞ tability. Regulated Þ rms are under the magniÞ er of 
a regulatory agency that cope with opposed objectives. They should think about 
a more balanced connection between market share and competitive activity. The 
strategy of competitive aggressiveness and complexity is acceptable only if it does 
not incur additional costs. Expenditures are admissible only for an action that re-
tains or improves their market share and proÞ tability. Moreover, the strategy to 
open some new markets is a promising strategy, especially the ones that avoids 
regulation. 
Limitations and future directions
The above presented results of the empirical study undoubtedly contribute to 
the competitive dynamics research stream, but with some limitations. First of all, 
market share is a performance indicator without dramatic changes over a three-
four year period. It could be useful to include a longer studied time period and 
to analyze competitive behavior among competing Þ rms and their consequences 
on Þ rm market share. This research focused only on one performance indicator, 
although very important in the regulated telecommunications sector. Future re-
search can add value to competitive dynamics research by other Þ rm performance 
indicators, such as the return on sale measure. It could be very interesting to ana-
lyze proÞ t margins of challengers, especially those that are fully dependent on 
incumbents’ network offered on wholesale level. 
Incumbents have their hands tied in many segments of business on retail 
level, such as strong price controls by regulatory agencies and challenges with 
proÞ t margins. However, some of them established smaller companies that use 
wholesale services by the incumbent under the same conditions as any other 
challenger. In that way they disperse risks and set different competitive strate-
gies in order to acquire customers. Moreover, through those Þ rms incumbents 
can challenge performance measures by other competing Þ rms on the market. It 
could be very interesting to study how incumbents are trying to somehow avoid 
strict pricing rules imposed on retail offers and to compete more ß exibly on the 
market.
The above presented results show that imposed regulation has different con-
sequences for different Þ rms. Unregulated Þ rms beneÞ t on the market by using a 
more aggressive and more complex set of competitive moves. For future research 
it could be interesting to investigate what speciÞ c kind of regulatory obligation 
impacts different strategic options for regulated and non-regulated Þ rms.
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7. Conclusion
This research contributes to the competitive dynamics research stream. A 
longitudinal study of Þ rms from the telecommunications industry examines the 
inß uence of the competitive action repertoire concept on market share gains. The 
key Þ nding is that in the regulated telecommunications sector competitive action 
repertoire positively impacts change in market share gains in general, but that the 
effect is different for regulated and non-regulated Þ rms. Competitive aggressive-
ness positively impacts the year-on-year market share growth for non-regulated 
Þ rms, while there is a negative effect for regulated ones. Offer complexity has a 
positive impact on the year-on-year market share growth for non-regulated Þ rms. 
Regulated Þ rms are faced with a negative effect, but that effect is statistically 
insigniÞ cant. The regulation process opened up the incumbent’s network and in-
tensiÞ ed rivalry on the market.
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KONKURENTSKI REPERTOAR PODUZE A 
U TELEKOMUNIKACIJSKOJ DJELATNOSTI
Sažetak
Rad prikazuje kako konkurentski repertoar poduze a i eksterno regulatorno okruženje utje-
u na uspješnost poduze a u reguliranoj telekomunikacijskoj djelatnosti. Na temelju panel analize 
podataka na 103 poduze a koja pružaju uslugu Þ ksnog pristupa Internetu krajnjim korisnicima u 
zemljama Europe i u vremenskom promatranju kroz tri godine, rezultati pokazuju da konkurent-
ska agresivnost i kompleksnost poduze a pozitivno utje u na rast udjela na tržištu. Za razliku od 
op eprihva enog mišljenja, rezultati empirijskog istraživanja pokazuju da najagresivnija poduze a 
zapravo gube tržišni udio iz godinu u godinu. Kompleksnost i konkurentska agresivnost pozitivno 
utje u na promjenu udjela na tržištu kod nereguliranih poduze a, dok to nije slu aj kod reguliranih 
poduze a.
Klju ne rije i: konkurentska dinamika, konkurentski repertoar, regulacija, telekomunikacij-
ska djelatnost, Þ ksni pristup Internetu
